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Abstract
Each individual is guided by values that determine his behaviour. A recurrentdistinction concerns the difference between applied values and final values,therefore between values concerning individual practices and values whichrepresent real goals to achieve. The discussion tends to slip onto a juxtapositionof universal values and universal rights, which is to say between human valuesand human rights. It is not always easy to discern secular values from religiousvalues. The main issue regards those who hold religious and secular values. Ifreligious values are presumably conserved by churches, denominations,confessional organizations, for secular values the State is usually considered to bethe main holder. Global values and local values can be in conflict, especiallywhen the same individual has to play a number of different rules. And it must beconsidered that today migration context in Europe presents different communitieswith different values.
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De los valores a la religión
Resumen
Cada persona se guía por valores que determinan su comportamiento. Hay unadistinción recurrente entre valores aplicados y valores finales, así mismo entrevalores referentes a pràcticas individuales y valores que representan objetivosreales a conseguir. La discusión tiende a plantearse como una yuxtaposición entrevalores universales y derechos universales, es decir, entre valores humanos yderechos humanos. No siempre es fácil discernir entre valores seculares y valoresreligiosos. El tema principal hace referencia a aquellas personas que sostienenvalores religiosos y seculares. Si los valores religiosos presuntamente se hallan eniglesias, denominaciones y organizaciones confesionales, para los valoresseculares el estado suele considerarse el principal detentor. Valores globales yvalores locales pueden entrar en conflicto, especialmente cuando la mismapersona tiene que jugar un número diferente de normas. Y debe tenerse enconsideración que, en Europa, el actual contexto migratorio presenta diferentescomunidades con diferentes valores.
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uman action is motivated by many factors. Among these,values have an outstanding role. Each individual is guided byfundamental values that determine his behaviour. Such valuesare deeply rooted and abstract ideas, even if they are susceptible ofempirical validation, and can be considered “objective”. Values aremostly important, because they are regarded as belonging to a superiorlevel. They cannot be replaced so easily; they are not negotiable, andthey are at the same time highly desirable. That is the reason whyindividuals are prepared to face sacrifices and all sorts of difficulties forthem. From the consideration given to a certain value, we derive everypractical element. The evaluation of good and evil, right or wrong,legitimate or illegitimate is based on the values organization of eachindividual. Values can be either a starting point or a target to pursue, anidea to be implemented, a goal to achieve. Therefore, we might say thatvalues always inspire human behaviour either as a goal or as an originalinspiration. If taken as such, values may also become normative rules, some sortof validation criteria. They guide individual choices; therefore theyinteract with interests and pre­existent habits (in fact, values are notimmune from those interests and habits that are capable of consolidatingthem, instead of choosing among a wide variety of options or ofinterests and habits). However, it is important to maintain a distinctionbetween values as ideals (orienting individual life) and values as realpractices (aiming at a certain goal), at least for descriptive reasons. As amatter of fact, both meanings are present in empirical situations, whereit is usually impossible to establish which is prius and which is post.Neither values as ideals nor values as practice are mutually identifiable.To be more precise, we cannot analyse the situation only from abehaviouristic point of view. We will have to go further and consider awider variety of knowledge, made up by a network of interactionsbetween individuals and society, subjectivity and social structure,attitudes and behaviours. Nowadays, the ideal construction of Thomas and Znaniecki (1918­1920), which tend to stretch the concept of value to its maximum extent,appears no more valid. Values were considered to be full of meaning, in
H
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social relevance, whereas attitudes were considered the area ofindividual behaviour even when acted in a context representing thesame values. At the present time it seems more likely to assume aconnection between inspiring value and practical action, that is to say,between value and choice (or refusal to choose). In other words, theimplementation of a value, that is to say the preferred behaviour,involves the necessity for a distinction between what is desirable fromwhat is possible, thus reasonably considering actual contingencies.
Many authors agree on a cognitive dimension of values. At first, wehave to remember the work of Kluckhohn (1951) who, besides thecognitive dimension (related to judgment, either positive or negative,and to facts and behaviours) includes an affective dimension (regardingacceptance or refusal of those conforming or not conforming to values)and a selective dimension (that highlights the solid influence that valuesexert on human behaviour). This third dimension remains at an abstractand general level, especially in the case of reference values, but itbecomes a normative rule in the case of particular and contextualizedactions (Sciolla, 1998, p. 751). An ethical and political dimension can be added to the cognitive one.As such it is more closely connected with structures and organizedinstitutions. It is therefore necessary, in order to strengthen individualpositions, to connect them with shared values, in order to avoidexplaining each time ­ on an interpersonal level ­ attitudes andpreferences, habits and behaviours, criteria and proceedings. As a matterof fact, institutions do not often sufficiently support individuals infacing such responsibility; therefore, it is quite usual that a single socialactor decides personally to explain, to offer motivations and reasons forsome personal evaluations. In this way, he would face a harsh pluralityof different values and positions, a clear opposition of points of view, ofoperational choices and evaluations. The relation between subject andsociety is also discussed, as well as the connection between citizen andstate, social actor and social­political and economical context.
Cognitive dimension
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 In such situations the debate on the “crisis” or “end of values”emerges. In fact, there is a tendency in any society towardsdisorganization, giving up usual cohesion forms, and choosing easysolutions even if not democratic, in the sense that they are notlegitimized by an adequate consensus. If the frame of malaise iscomplicated by a high massification of communication processes andsocio­political influence, a utilitarian kind of action prevails over thecommunicative one, according to Habermas (1984; 1987). Valuesbecome therefore obsolete and meaningless. In the end, individuals work in a complete vacuum of values or in acontext that does not take them into consideration, because values, evenif commonly shared, have to come out as precise, not negotiabledecisions. The possibility to establish criteria, in this connection, is quitehard, because the risk is to give remedies that are not feasible inpractical situations. At this point, among the number of possibilities, oneway has to be chosen, either facing the risk of undesirable side effects orclearly going against ideal values. On the other hand, modernity andpost­modernity are compatible with such outcome also: one can go backand start all over again. Sociologists, and especially sociologists of knowledge, have no doubtabout the cognitive content of values. The typically Weberian operationconsists in giving sense to every single aspect of reality. Thereforevalues and meanings either seem to coincide or to be one over the other,in any case they have a very close connection. Identity is another Leitmotiv of the phenomenology of values. It isthrough values that people identify themselves in a movement, areligion, a political party or an ideological faith. At the same time,historical and sociological dynamics are such that individual charactersare taken into consideration, together with a proportional developmentof freedom and autonomy. One last constant is the guiding role assumed by social structures,political and law institutions, and collective organizations for socialactors. Legitimation and identification processes consolidate a feeling ofbelonging through rational and affective motivations. The centre of suchconsolidation of social relations consists in some basic values thatspecify the feeling of community participation.
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 Modern and post­modern have destroyed the presumed certainties ofthe past and have opened the way to “alternative” values, that is to sayless predictable and flexible (in contrast with the solidity of traditionalvalues). However, these new values allow unusual research foralternative knowledge based on different certainties, as truth becomes aprocess to build instead of a word to believe in. A wide variety of possible outcomes for the research of new non­traditional values is presented, these values are no more verticallytransmitted by previous generations, thanks also to consolidated habits,that are the bastion of any pre­existent value. Contemporary societieshave a very original challenge to face: they have to find new andreliable paths through grounded reasoning and solid motivations. Thiscalls for refined knowledge and adequate experiences. Easy ways outare not allowed in such a diversified society. The very ways of acting ofthe social actor are submitted to analysis and they produce new terms ofconfrontation in order to stimulate a more and more complex,problematic and articulated reflexivity, interacting with values,knowledge and social practices.
Together with values, interests and social habits have also anoutstanding influence on social and individual action. However, valueshave a particular position within the sociological dynamics thatpromotes and funds them. From the very beginning of its life, theindividual faces a number of pre­existent social elements, such as: hisparents (but sometimes only the mother), his relatives (sisters andbrothers, but also more distant relatives), the citizens of the samecountry (normally speaking the same language or the same dialect), hisneighbours (houses or jointly­owned building). All these peoplesurround the newborn, not only physically, but with their way of doing,speaking and acting also. This is how the very first and fundamentalcommunication begins: the newborn receives a variety of messages,without homogeneity, but to a certain extent convergent because they allbelong to the same cultural pattern. That is to say, a shared opinion
Interests and habits
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about life, about how to face it and about the convenient socialbehaviour. Finally, even before he is officially registered, the new socialsubject is de facto an “object”: object of attentions and looking after,affection and worries, with all the content of meanings, emotions andsigns to transmit. Actually, those who worry after the newborn have experiencedthemselves the same situation, when they were newborn. That is howideas, habits, attitudes and behaviours are transmitted from generation togenerations, building up some sort of continuous chain (except fromrare cases). There is no other explanation for such a continuity, that istoo often taken for granted, and therefore not quite considered in itsessential influence on reality, and in this way on a certain
Weltanschauung. This is taken as a natural event. The world “naturally”considered is accepted as it is, it does not represent a problem, and itenters daily life becoming as a habit where nothing is to be discussed. Atypical Leitmotiv is “that’s the way it goes”. Therefore, mothers usuallyfeed their newborns or take care of them, as well as fathers mostly takecare of material and economic goods for a living, and elderly peopleprovide a link with the past, representing the continuity of existence.However, we must also consider that values fit in an already fixedframe. History has shown how to accumulate experiences, institutionalorganizations have developed and a solid knowledge has been acquired.This is the place where the new social actor is deemed to live anddevelop. Spring water follows the grove traced by former water passing by, aswell as socializing individuals follow an already signed path, a sort ofcompulsory way with no possibilities of choosing other alternatives,especially in the very beginning. Only later, with the years, there will bethe possibility of following a non regular path. Only when the age ofreason and full autonomy are reached, unusual paths, original ways andunpredictable solutions will be made possible. Constitution of interests precedes any proposals of values. Interests ofnewborns, besides some primary needs which are common to allnewborn children, do not seem to be innate. There are essential needs asself­preservation, protection, maintenance, search for pleasure, capacity
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of avoiding any unpleasant situation and especially physical arm (oraffective arm, linked to the loss of something beloved or somethingjudged essential for living). As a matter of fact, values proposed byexternal stimuli are likely to work upon already defined interests, orwell known for the destination subject. The same thing can be said forsome social deep rooted habits. They become a sort of habitus(Bourdieu, 1977) for all subjects who tend to conform to existingattitudes, or make use of common sense solutions in order to beaccepted by others. Finally, even before their own values, social actorshave to face external habits, likely to become their own and with thesame basic interests, that will be of great influence when they will haveto make a choice. According to Ronald Inglehart, who has been developing systematicempirical research on values in America and Europe, abilities andstructures are to be considered the prior independent variables thatinfluence social change. When Inglehart talks of “abilities” (1977:
Introduction), he refers to the tendency of people to be interested inpolitics, to understand it and to participate in it, as an attitude of“challenge to élites”. When referring to structures, Inglehart meanseconomical, social and political structures of the countries of hiscomparative studies: France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy,Luxemburg, Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain. The same point of view is used by Inglehart (1997) also in thefollowing research on 43 countries. This research is focused moreprecisely on modern and post­modern processes, which havehighlighted a greater attention on quality of life and self realization,together with more individualization. The new finding is reflexivity thatinduces to take the distance from absolute values and directs themwithin a more subjective context, based on individual preferences. Thiswould take place with a degree of uncertainties, hesitations andinconveniences, as well as long waiting, contradictions anddisappointments. However, the final outcome elaborated by theindividual would be the production of new rules, a law more coherentwith the problems of social actors, especially the young ones. As such,the primary socialization process remains in the background, while the
International andMultidisciplinary Journal ofSocial Sciences 1(2) 107
secondary socialization process intervenes in a more decisive way. Itenhances a horizontal movement, among generations, ready to substitutethe former one, characterized by an inter­generational profile (fromolder generations to younger ones). The sociological consequence ofthis dynamic change is a “polytheism of values”, as well as of reasonsand motivations of values, therefore of all the actions deriving from it,as Bontempi underlined (2001). Within the diversity of consideredvariables, there is an essential agreement about the sociologicaldiscourse applied to values, because empirical findings confirm theinterpretation that we have here offered. While Inglehart mainlyemphasized the role of education, we here suggest a preference for thephase that precedes school socialization. The secondary phase seemsobviously less important than the primary one of the familysocialization, which also have a long lasting period of introduction tolife, a sort of initiation that cannot be ignored.
Values can be independent variables, those at the origin of interests,habits, identity processes and social solidarity, but they can also bedependent variables, those deriving from other social factors. In bothcases values have a central position. On a general consideration wemight call them human values because they are linked with humansubjects and their fundamental tendencies, and with their fundamentalbeliefs and evaluations, oriented to assume decisions. The variety ofhuman values is very wide. It is almost all­pervading. It embraces manyfields: from knowledge to communication, from law to ethic and moral,from policy to economics, from education to medical and sanitary, fromreligion to secular, from daily life to general living. A recurrentdistinction concerns the difference between applied values and finalvalues (Rokeach, 1973), therefore between values concerning individualpractices and values which represent real goals to achieve. Another distinction quite widespread is between universal values andparticular values. But the discussion is still open on which are theuniversal values. In particular the discussion tends to slip onto a
Human values
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juxtaposition of universal values and universal rights, which is to saybetween human values and human rights. During the last Century thedevelopment of human rights has kept pace with the “scientification”process, an important increase of social and practical relevance ofscientific and academic studies. Especially by the end of World War II,authority and influence of scientific research have been taken more intoconsideration, particularly in medical, economical and managementfields (Drori, Meyer, Ramirez, & Schofer, 2003). However,democratization dynamics, although growing, have not reached the levelof human rights at the top of the scale. They passed from an interestwith a few nations and organizations at the beginning of the 20thCentury, to a number of more than three hundred organizations andnations directly involved by the end of the same Century. In this regard,the role of the so called high education has been decisive (Schofer &Meyer, 2005). We can say that human rights widespread have become aworld event. Therefore, it represents a significant modality in the morerecent globalization processes. Problems of equality and exclusion, forinstance, are a constant issue at the present time. They are a must in theinternational socio­political agenda. By now, the lack of participation ofsome groups – especially minorities, rural and of a low social­economical status – to higher education levels represents a strong callfor attention and sensitivity for governments and internationalorganizations. Due to the Universal Declaration of Human Rightspublished by the United Nations, a strong interest for equality amongindividuals and for democratic participation values has been increasingfor years. We shall now ask: “Are there other universal human rights?”As a matter of fact, what makes universal a human right is not acommonly shared opinion among nations. At most the Declaration canrepresent a valid reference, even if it has not been signed and fosteredby all nations worldwide. In absence of a commonly shared opinionamong sociologists about the existence of values, sociological researchcan only give empirical surveys about the presence of averagewidespread values in each culture or socio­geographical and politicalcontext. Only a worldwide survey, using an appropriate and significantmethodology, based on a comparative interpretation could provide
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general indications about the existence of meta­values, that is to say,values empirically found in various society that, when compared on alarger scale, may be indicated as universal. In other words, values such as freedom, democracy, respect forindividuals, “sacredness” of life, equality among individuals and othersare not necessarily to be considered universal, just because they areprevailing in a certain part of the world. There are situations andconditions of various natures in the world which do not recognize suchvalues, thus clearly showing that only a certain part of the worldsustains and claims them as universal.
The issue of universal values is not secondary. The necessity ofspreading abroad the values of some organizations and nations dependsdirectly on this issue. An example can be made for freedom ordemocracy: we shall ask ourselves if it is ethically desirable to exportsuch values through the means of war which is already an implicitdenial of freedom and democracy itself. However, if in a particularcontext other values are considered as fundamental (or simply moreimportant) than human life, in this case it is impossible to think about“sacredness” of life as a universal value. As we can see, determiningwhich universal values are is not easy. Everything we say may becontradicted by empirical results. Individuals and community structuresdecide if a value is “good” and worth following it in their daily action orin the long run. Universal values, spread worldwide and commonlyshared by all cultures, can only be seen as hypothetical views. Thehypothesis can be destined to a failure as soon as an empirical surveyshows an opposite thesis. In order to provoke (but also to produce ascientific knowledge applied to dynamics of values), we might startpretending that suppression of human life is a value in order to verify ifsuch a position is commonly shared by all social realities existing in theworld. We might find that the sacrifice of one’s life is particularlyappreciated in certain areas, within a certain cultural, ideological andreligious faith, thus granting privileges to a goal different from that
Universal values
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envisaging a totally negative opinion on taking a man’s life eithervoluntarily or coerced. Moreover, in the same social reality we mightenvisage a clear opposition between values of the majority and those ofa minority group. It is the typical case of the deviant or marginal groups,which follow logics of values that are different from that of the majority.It does not mean that chosen values exert a radically different influence:the group loyalty inside a criminal band may be highly superior to thatinside the team of a firm. A possible solution might be found by speaking about quasi­universalor para­universal values. This means that the suggested classificationcannot pretend to be exhaustive nor to be susceptible of generalization.It would be better to avoid radical and self­referring positions. Values donot depend only on the capacity of a dominant group to impose them toother individual and social groups. Moreover, respect or no respect forvalues is linked with many not easily foreseeable variables. Especiallyin the field of values many predictions are bound to failure. The amountof variables involved in the victory of values is quite varied. In somesituations values are commonly shared; in others they are not; in somesituations they are in evident opposition; in others they are not squarelyopposed to “counter values”. As human beings are variable, values aswell have a variable stability. This latter depends on the degree ofimportance that each value has for a single individual and for the group.It is not by chance that the most difficult decisions to take are thoseconcerning a discussion on more than one value, equally present in thecultural and personal background, according to a classification which ismore or less aware, but which becomes evident when there is a decisionto take. However, even if a certain value has an influence stronger thanthe others have, it cannot be taken for granted that in the future, on asimilar occasion, the same value will prevail again. Situations, actualconditions and other factors, the affective ones also, can have a decisiveinfluence, in such a way as to be often independent from the scale ofvalues of the single social actor.
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In general, it is impossible for a value to change without having otherimportant mutations around it, especially if other values do change.How about freedom value: a transformation of this value cannot takeplace, without a different perception of the State and without ademocratic participation to the life of a nation. At times combinationsbetween values, within a developing process, are quite difficult to findand it is even harder to venture hypothesis. It happens that values incontradiction between them may live together and give shape to atransformation of primary socialization. One should not forget that thewill of a single person is sovereign and is usually impossible to unveilhis intent and the deep reasons for his procedural choices. The morecommonly shared global and local values go through modifications,confirmations and adjustments also. The very idea of democracy andfreedom may be interpreted differently according to different culturalframe of reference and/or initial ideological and political perspectives.When we say “Cuba libre”, for example, that is to say Free Cuba, theinterpretation can be double, either it refers to the issue of liberating theIsland from the government of Fidel Castro, defined as a dictatorship, orit can be interpreted in relation to the idea of setting Cuba free from USeconomical, military and capitalistic power. This dichotomy shows a tendency to oppose values one against theother; therefore, one value would be preferred by one party but not bythe other, and vice versa. The option is a consequence of decisionsoperated in favour of an approach which may be affective or neutral,individual or collective, particularistic or universalistic, specific orwidespread, ascribed or acquired (Parsons, 1951). Actually, the choiceamong values does not follow all the alternatives, but it is centred onsome topics and issues. Here the central role is played by the variableinterwoven with the culture and the society. From a Durkheimian pointof view, we can establish some sort of collective morality (Durkheim,1973), that has its foundation in the society itself, in a commonbelonging of the individual to a community, whose interest is directlyproportionate to the respect that a complex of social rules enjoys among
Social change and moral values
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its members. The question does not concern the solution of the vagueidea of Durkheim when he puts forward a “collective consciousness”, asa typical character of a “sacred” society. The respect for society isimplemented by practising its moral norms, without any criticism ofthem. An immediate effect is respect for the individual also, butaccording to Durkheim this is a secondary consequence. Moreover, inthis approach, the individual can bring only a minimum, almostinvisible support, because with it and through it only a generic andabstract collectivism is respected ­ a collectivism that lacks any seriousindividual contribution to the building up of a collective morality, to beunderstood not as particularly authoritarian, although deprived of aconsensus in the proper sense. There is no lack of studies and interpretative proposals endowed withdifferent visions that either suggest a relation between values andattitudes (for a functionalistic approach: Brewster Smith, 2006) or insiston moral values (Hartmann, 2002) and on a possibility of education,particularly stressed in international reviews such as Journal of Beliefs
& Values, Journal ofMoral Education, Issues in Religious Education, orfinally, special research centres should be recalled such as the Centre of
Beliefs and Values at the University of Wales, Lampeter.Recently, an outstanding increment of ethical sensitivity as regardspublic issues has occurred. This concerns the behaviour of individuals ina collective situation and in relation to public interests withinadministrative, managerial, political, trade union and economiccontexts. In general, public opinion and mass media tend to emphasizethose events and episodes that fall below widespread expectations aboutcitizenship, nationality and cultural identity. It seems that managers andpolicy makers are more than ever willing to move away from individualand institutional control. Actually, it has become quite a problem todetect any ethical foundation in economic and political decisions. Neo­contractual and neo­utilitarian perspectives that emerged worldwidetogether with the new wave of conservative perspectives, named neocon(neoconservative), have reduced the ethic issue to the necessity ofbiding by formal rules as a justification to avoid facing new problems. The ingenious proposal of Niklas Luhmann (1995), based on aconception of society as a mere procedure, managed by cybernetic
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algorithms and formal rules, belongs to a para­bureaucratic vision thatwould see society as a huge machine, without self­awareness andwithout a historic consciousness both from an individual and a groupview­point. The already started and implemented attempts have notproduced adequate results; moreover they have increased the number ofnon participating individuals to a direct management of the society towhich they belong. Neither contractual, nor utilitarian and functionalistproposals, even if well presented and revised, have succeeded topromote rooting (or on the contrary, a change) of shared values amongindividuals within their social network. Not even Weberian world disenchantment has fostered an ultimateturn, and with his idea of awareness for polytheism of values, he seemsto have created more problems. He did not at all solve the problem of anethic issue for society, because having various principles is equal tohaving none. In the meantime social actors continuously have to facenon avoiding issues and to take urgent decisions. The social and humandevelopment itself is bound to be affected because this kind ofdevelopment confronts us with a problem that cannot be examined, noteven solved, by giving up any hypothesis of orienting ethical criteria asfar as the initiatives to be implemented are concerned. Weberian
Wertfreiheit provokes a number of critical opinions as well. Thisapproach insists on the distinction between facts and values, thereforesocial scientists are asked to keep at a definite distance from their ownvalues, thus totally renouncing to any sort of evaluation judgementtowards a scientific “object”. The outcome is that the analysis of socialscientists is limited to data gathering and interpreting. A major criticismto this approach is the non­neutrality of a scientific method and thepresumed neutrality of all kinds of theories of knowledge. Apparently,some sort of influent and active value references or ethical fundamentsare acting behind every presumed neutral research, even if scientistsmight not be consciously aware of it. At the very beginning of anymethodologically correct research experience declaring its neutralitythere would be apparently a great number of values. Just because thesevalues are different and polymorphic, they are the evidence of valuepluralism at the source, in nuce, even before the research has started. The Kantian idea of a universal ethic, from which common values for
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harmony in the world and among men derive, has lost many fans and isno longer in fashion. Contemporary sociologists cannot ignore that thereis something more (or less, according to the different points of view)than “a starry sky above us” and more than the “moral conscience whichis inside us”. Calling for rationality adds more complexity. Whatrationality should we use? The lay rationality generated by the FrenchEnlightenment? European history (and not only European) has shownlimits, idiosyncrasies and eventually tragic consequences of thatapproach. More particularly, history lets us see that thought, even of asmall élite and very attentive, is not effective and protective ofeverybody’s rights. Shall we give up research, which is likely to giveuseless results, in order to look for shared ethical references? Or can wedecide in favour of comparing various ethical systems of inquiry, inorder to define the more acceptable and recurrent tendencies? Habermassuggested an ethic of discourse. A double­way of open communicationto be acted among pairs, with people having faith in each other and whoare open to critical remarks, who do not hold the absolute truth, who arereceptive of other people’s opinions, oriented to continuous research ofcommon good and in the interest of the community.
At this very point, the weakness of ideology has been clearly shown.Ideologies deny any solution with an ethic of discourse. Such a criticalnote concerns both religious and lay perspectives, because both of themare glued to their deep convictions. A double fundamentalism, religiousand lay, is not suitable for communicative acting, which is in search ofan adequate solution for a number of social subjects. A quick solution isnot desirable from this perspective, because it has to be reached with anexplicit consensus of the majority. Actually, a widely useful solutionmight also come from the point of view of a minority. The mostimportant thing is that it is not coercively imposed, without any legal,military, and affective blackmail. A rapidly and easily reached goal iswith no promise for the future. Only a consolidated praxis, which hasbecome tradition and habit, even though respectful of the interests of thesocial actors, can succeed in becoming a wide consensus reference.
Values, ideologies and religion
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However, a delicate issue is the influence of individual interests. Whenthey have become steady habits and traditions, they are hardly put asidein order to give way to a social perspective. Regulation of subjectiverequests seems to be necessary, in order not to harm collectiveexpectations. Nowadays, there is an evident increasing respect for individual rights,which are separate to a certain extent from the social context and do noteasily combine with the issue of solidarity. The idea of a social actor istherefore an attempt to place the individual within a relational network,thus underlining his/her human characteristics of socialization, sharing,dialogue, confrontation, values, from neither a non utilitarian norfunctional point of view. Migration dynamics, which have a multi­cultural, multi­religious, multi­linguistic shape, emphasize the urgencyof common values and adequate ethical principles which are able tosolve conflicts, misunderstandings and struggles. The hypothesis ofuniversal values widely accepted by different ethnic groups seems to befar too utopian. The idea that social subjects who belong to differentreligious faiths have visions of life squarely divided into good and evilwith no possibility of dialogue, mediation, or discussion to find sharedpositions without conflict cannot even be thought of. Sometimes thereare rules, adequate behaviours and coherent attitudes, usually widelyaccepted, which not even through the transcendental dimension of areligion really become accepted. That is why, speaking of ethic values, itis worthwhile reading Weber once again. But, this time, acceptingWeber’s suggestion in terms of an ethic of responsibility, thus takinginto account the immediate situation, the urgency of problem solvingwithout harming anybody, if not to a minimum extent and for the goodof the community. One might take into consideration evaluating theconsequences of a certain action, or seeing the effects of some kind ofacting. Therefore, the complexity of making a choice is always inbetween community maximum gain on the one hand, and what canpossibly be realized, on the other hand. All the so called universal religions contain values that present acertain vision of the world, a certain meaning of life and a specific ideaof human destiny, from those referring to books (Judaism, Christianityand Islam) to oriental ones (Taoism, Confucianism, Hinduism,
Cipriani - From Values to Religion116
Buddhism, Shinto). A concise value centred attempt of syncretism mayallow a slight convergence of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, despitemany past and present historical events show a clear intolerance of thesereligions to reach shared solutions. However, official and organizedattempts have been made, and others will be done in the future,probably. Oriental and Chinese religions have the remarkableexperience of Ju­Fu­Tao that melts together Confucianism, Buddhismand Taoism in one religion. Ju­Fu­Tao is fairly practised especially bymodern Chinese people. Somewhere else, in Japan, they go further, notonly have they cults and values that belong to other Asiatic religions(especially Shinto and Buddhism) but they also include some elementsof Christianity, thus determining a mixture of values and practiceswhich are often alternated, according to the personal living of subjects,their families and communities. It is not by chance that in the firstdecade of the past Century there was an attempt of melting Shinto,Buddhism and Christianity. Among the more widespread values in theEast, veneration of past generations has to be remembered. Actually, itis a real cult of the ancestors. Part of it is also the highest value given topiety for sons, which extends to a respect owed to any other humanbeings. In some cases attention to people precedes the devotion fordivinity, so that important personalities, called masters, become moreimportant than divinities. In respect to the ethical and social character ofConfucianism, Buddhism develops more the value of spirituality. Wealso have to say that the declaration of the Republic of China, at thebeginning of the past Century, the system proposed by Sun Yat­Senbecame widespread. This system is based on three new values:nationalism, democracy and socialism. Socialism assumes a lessidealistic and more military character with the advent of Maoism. Hinduism and Buddhism, on the other hand, continue to appear moresensitive to eschatological issues, in particular to the destiny of humanbeings at the end of their parcours de vie. In fact, central values ofHindus and Buddhists are connected to the dynamics of thetransmigration of souls, which is why spiritual aspects are emphasized.However, within Hinduism, the division in castes produces certainconsequences. Attempts of refusals, for instance, gave way to the birthof new religions, such as Sikhism, which was funded by Nanak five
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Centuries ago. Kabir’s attempt of bypassing ritualism and idolatry isalmost contemporary, enhancing a melting of Hinduism and Islam. Suchan idea was proposed again but from a political point of view, byMuslim Indian emperor Akbar. Islam succeeded at the end, owing tomilitary reasons as well imposed by the Mogul sovereign Shah Jahan.Hinduism comes into fashion after a more spiritual turn (deriving fromBrahmanism), which introduces the predication of values such asgoodness, sustained by Devendranath Tagore, father of the famous poet,who was himself a fundamental reference for Hindu culture. A furtherpush towards uniting different religions appears from time to time: atfirst with Ram Mohan Roy, who was in favour of a so called UnitarianHinduism and enhancing British reformism in India. And after withKeshab, who tried to annex Christianity within Unitarian Hinduism.Later on, Ramakrishna fostered a total syncretism of all religions. Thevitality of Hinduism’s internal dynamics is confirmed by the exaltedvalue for vegetarian life, preached by Dayananda Sgravati, who is alsoactive in Europe and in the United States. Finally there is MahatmaGandhi who prays for values such as non­violence, passive resistance,purity and truth. Later on there is also religious tolerance as a furthervalue. On the other hand, Buddhism has insisted on absence of desire asa value, connected with body control and the principle of self­help. Thebirth of a theosophical society, based on Buddhism and Hinduism, isrelated to the age­old trends of oriental religions. In the meantime, the history of mankind is full of philosophical andreligious readings, from Arabian Averroës to Hebrew Maimonide andChristian Thomas d’Aquino. In Literature, Chaucer exalts communityand social brotherhood values in his Canterbury Tales. Erasmus andThomas Moore speak about the value of a simple life. Rousseau insistson free thinking. The philosophers Lessing and Herder envisage thepossibility of human development in all religions. Wordsworth noticesthe spiritual side of community life. The New York Ethic Society isfounded by Felix Adler while Stanton Colt creates the English EthicSociety. Horace Bridges has to do with the Ethic Society of Chicago.Tolstoj and Kropotkin write down the values of social justice and humanbrotherhood. Rauschenbush should be remembered for his “socialgospel”, while John Dewey and J. Middleton Murry should be
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remembered respectively the former for A common Faith and the latterfor “religious socialism”. Albert Einstein should also be mentioned forhis respect of human life and ethic values. Martin Buber as well givesgreat importance to the individual dimension. With such premises, theidea of realizing the first international congress on humanism and ethicculture comes as a natural consequence by the second half of the lastCentury. Hans Küng, who has completed the publication of his trilogy on thethree “book” religions, besides having underlined the numerouscommon elements among them, he also confirms that “there arecommon bases: do not kill, do not torture, do not violate; do not steal,do not corrupt, do not betray; do not lie, do not give false testimony; donot commit abuse. These principles belong to all religions. Usually,Catholics totally agree. In some cases the problem arises, when respectfor life is identified with the condemnation of contraceptives, whenthere is a consideration of abortion which is too rigid, if there is adiscriminatory attitude towards homosexuality or if the problems linkedto euthanasia are not understood”. He concludes: “we need moralfundamentals. But these cannot be laicism, neither can they beclericalism, or restoration of Christian Europe as Pope Wojtyla desired.There cannot be a restoration of an atheist State as it happened after theFrench Revolution. We need a common ethic ground, which means toaccept basis ethical norms sustained by all important religion and byphilosophical traditions, which can also be accepted by non believers”.
Religious values, because they are contained within an ideologicalsystem, have a number of fundamental ideas, which often meancondemnations, precepts and prohibitions. Such a characteristic does notprevent them from being quite widely accepted. It can happen that forthe sake of a confessed and practised religion, one tries to propose onesown values, asking for a legal recognition in the constitution, withinactual norms and in the regulation of cults, with extensions that cancomprehend aspects which are far from those peculiar to a religious
Values and needs of social life
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faith. Especially when a crisis of values occurs, recurring to religiousvalues seems to be a successful and unavoidable remedy. However,sociological research results clearly suggest that no value, eitherreligious or lay, can totally satisfy all the needs of social life alone. Thesame can be said for every group of values that belong to a certainreligious faith. Law, public organization and public procedures cannotsolve their complexity just within one frame of reference values. At firstwe have to consider that all situations evolve, appearing inunpredictable ways and often presenting complications impossible tosolve. The possibility of conforming a jurisdiction to a specific group ofreligious values in order to “educate” social actions does not seem to bean adequate solution to face the diversities inside societies and to solvethe problem at its very origin, even less can it help predicting thedevelopment of democratic dynamics or anticipating any sort ofpolitical choice. Moreover, whether religious or not, values do notcomplete their influence and function in a particular law order. They aremore than that. That is why they have a much wider reference, a moresolid foundation given by the same social actors, and beyond any futilesimplification they exert a strong critical influence on choices to bemade. Values do not seem to be an “all occasion recipe”. An attentiveanalysis of social reality is usually required to put values into practice.Even more so, values are a general tendency and they are not capable ofdepriving the individual of his freedom taking the place of theindividual’s reflexive action. More than some sort of defence, values arelike an encouragement for acting in the world with great attention butfearless. Actually, values seem to have something in common withscientific theories: both are able to guide without forcing the individual,they both give autonomy to a certain extent, they use "transcendence"not in a mere religious sense but as a way to overcome exclusive,unchanging and unfailing principles. However, it is not a sort of diffusedrelativism to be used at all costs, it is rather an attentive and educatedapproach, which comprehends pluralism but at the same time shows anawareness of relativity of the existing and possibly feasible differentpositions. The social actor can therefore assume a sort of startingweakness of values, more than flexibility, because they are
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bound to come up against social reality data and face their ownevolution. It is not by chance that a fundamental state law, which is theconstitution, even if considered “sacred”, needs to be up­dated and to berevised, also for the search for “almost” universal values. Such “almost”universal values means that they are mostly retained consensual towardswhat cannot be ignored at a certain moment oftime and within a certain
society. That is why every attempt of state religion, as a pact betweenreligion and state, does not last long. Individuals are willing topersonally elaborate what is codified. That means that they are keen togive their own interpretation and, even more, they tend to apply it withmeasure, criticism, focusing on the situations. Pacts between churchesand public administrations, even if, on the one hand, they lead to goodresults, offering advantages and facilitating religious organizations, theyalso represent an obstacle for an unconditioned acceptance by citizens.Thus, taking back their individual rights, citizens exert their own rightsbypassing the agreement between high religious and political officials.Religion loses its character of value­bearer for all and is perceived asmere ideology and power, therefore it becomes similar to other forcingstructures.
It is not always easy to discern secular values from religious values.Some religious values are widely accepted also by those who declare tobe of lay tendencies. Vice versa, there are some typically secular valueswhich are accepted by people inspired by religious principles. The mainissue regards those who hold religious and secular values. If religiousvalues are presumably conserved by churches, denominations,confessional organizations, for secular values the State is usuallyconsidered to be the main holder. However, in this case it is better to useanother adjective: in fact they are “secularist” or “laicist” values, morethen secular or lay values which usually have their moral basis inpersonal consciousness, which is in the free and autonomous possibilityof choice of the individual. At this point there is a similar individualattitude and behaviour towards religion and politics, as well as towards
Secular values
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church and state. Finally, absolute values are not sociologicallydominant because values and ethical aims are various and differentlyshaped, therefore they are not related to the same one religious and/orpolitical system. We also have to consider that a supposed unity ofreligious values is not necessarily related only to one form of politicalorganization, as well. Vice versa, a shared political situation does notmean that there is only one platform of values. In other words, Weberianpolytheism of values is true both for the religious as well as the publicsphere. Every institution is founded on a certain degree of shared values,therefore it is never neutral and without prejudice. A lay point of viewalso has its own burden of values. A State that assumes to be ethical, forexample, becomes the main source of values for its citizens, whousually turn their autonomous capacity of taking decisions, using theirown personal conscience and taking advantage of their freedom ofacting. However, if the State is founded on ethical principles and aims atprotecting them within its citizens, it becomes a further guarantee forfreedom of thought and action. Especially if the value of freedom ishighly considered, in relation to the individual rights on one’s body(“this body is mine and I can do what I want with it”) as well as onproperty rights on non material goods (“this is my mind and I can use itas I like”). Also a “cybernetic” idea of social reality, such as Luhmann’s neo­functionalism (1995), might be identified as based on the laic­secularvalues of good functioning, order, social balance and of a systematicregulation. Historical and social experience has already verified that thisapproach is not self­sufficient and has to face individual autonomy andits own free choices. When there is no reciprocity between State valuesand the citizens tendencies a crisis of society occurs, thus causingconflicts of values and an increasing number of anomic behaviour. Agood functioning of social structure is assured by widespread values,and it can only occur when the structure is basic values and all itssubdivisions are in harmony with the orienting tendencies of socialactors. As H. Tristram Engelhardt (1996) would say, individuals are not“moral strangers”. On the background of these secular and lay picturesis the value of freedom of consciousness, a basic character that no Statecan substitute. That is why any State, whether lay, “laicist” or secular,
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“secularist”, cannot leave out from consideration either ethicalautonomy of religions or ethical autonomy of social actors. However,even if it does not imply that politics depends on religion, they bothhave to recall the value of reasoning, whose characteristic is to be a lay­secular value originated by French Enlightenment but which is wellknown by universal and non universal religious traditions. It is not easyto contest that secular and lay values have some origins in metaphysicalfaith. History of philosophy is full of examples. A number ofphilosophers have actually fostered the consolidation of some values bygiving them a sacred “aura”, which is already a metaphysical definition. The existing relation between secular and religious values therefore isnot a surprise. As a matter of fact, in order to understand change ofvalues, it is necessary to understand the origins of such values as well.Therefore, traditions and old paths have to be explored again, in order tohave a clear vision of the present situation. Along this research, it is easyto realize that a wide part of contemporary values has ancient originsbelonging to religious inspiration. From the point of view of sociologyof knowledge we can say that a longer lasting of religious institutionsand their intellectual élites has influenced social dynamics more than theephemeral tenure of political and State structures. However, theenduring effects of norms, administrative structures, styles of life, socialhabits of a nation, and the linguistic idiom itself that, defining anddistinguishing phenomena, people, events, objects and much more, theyactually recognize, legitimate and consolidate the field of values. In themeantime, if religions lose strength and the ability of orientingthemselves, their typical values show the effects. They become weak ona large scale, as well as value principles of political parties, or uniontrusts, or any other kind of group which starts to lose popularity inpublic opinion. One of the first indicators of this kind of weakness is theadvent of new value pluralisms, with alternative values, and anincreasing instability of previous values, defended in the end by moremilitant groups, which are therefore keener on fundamentalisms.
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A better mobility of people throughout the world is visibly increasingthe occasions of sharing values as well as occasions of clashes betweendifferent values. That is why there is a sort of competition of politicaland governmental structures for defining constitutions, laws and rules inorder to protect basic local principles from other cultural valuesimported from people expected to arrive. In the meantime, bettersolutions for facing the clash of values are under consideration. The USat first tried the strategy of the melting pot, which consists of mixing allcultural peculiarities and hopefully delete the differences, and after ittried the strategy of the salad bowl, willing to respect the differentvalues without changing them, but none of these attempts had positiveresults. Europe is now trying, and not only Europe, to make laws on thebasis of local particular values of the belonging countries. However,every single country has the right to adjust such values according to itsnecessities even if it cannot refuse European shared values. Among the major values are: gender equality, freedom of speech,freedom of education, the refusal of war as a solution for conflicts,peaceful living together of people with different cultural origins,abolition of the death penalty, non racial discrimination, schoolintegration, ideological and religious pluralism and last, but not least,freedom of consciousness. Regarding this, there are already a number ofofficial declarations and signed documents by various parts. Thedefinition of the parts also shows a clear will to declare to be faithfuland practicing of religion, as well as being part of a nation. In Italy, forinstance, both Islamic and Hebrew communities are particularly willingto specify their national as well as religious belonging. This is also theoutcome of a long history that has given maximum power to God at first(sovereigns as well were assigned by divinity) and only in a secondphase has offered to its democratically elected representatives thepossibility to elect rulers in order to make laws for the wholecommunity. In the past not respecting the rules was a sin against God,nowadays it is called crime and is committed against individuals andsocieties. Responding to such a change of mentality the CatholicChurch, which is a main part of universal religions, has renewed its
Global and local values
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vocabulary by defining crimes major social sins such as: fiscal frauds,negligence at work, drug selling, gambling, mystification of public truthby modifying communication contents, and other "anti­social"behaviour. However, these preached values are not really accepted becausedamage to the community is hardly considered a strictly fundamentalvalue for individuals. There are just a few shared referring values forrecurrent convictions concerning homicide, stealing, sexual harassmentand few other crimes. Notwithstanding this, society preserves a sacred,superior and almost metaphysical character. Social values seem to berequired by unavoidable authorities that force individuals to respectthem. And this happens when values have been interiorized and deeplyaccepted by individuals. Global values and local values can be in conflict, especially when thesame individual has to play a number of different rules. In this caseinterests and habits are struggling, therefore there is a conflict of valueoriented choices against goal oriented choices, as well as interests of thecommunity against personal and/or family needs. Other factors mayplay a role, such as interpersonal relations, class relations (which is notan easy dimension to wipe out, well beyond Marxist theories),awareness of one’s role within a certain society. It is clear enough nowthat some “universal” values (nowadays called global values) areactually representative of one social class only, which is the bourgeoisie.In other words the French revolutionary triad of values of freedom,brotherhood and equality is now going through a wide and rigorousrevision. At the end, the social actor also decides to accept certainvalues instead of others according to a rational calculus of personalconvenience, in other words he can operate a “rational choice” (as oneof the most quoted contemporary sociological theories) (Coleman &Fararo, 1992). However, we cannot ignore the individual choice infavour of personal preferences, the social actor in fact may choose somevalues also because they mean something to him, or because they areattractive and convincing even though they do not represent a rationallyuseful choice. One last individual interpretation of values cannot beforgotten. Values may reduce to something without significance, thusbecoming open to any kind of further interpretation and implementation.
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However, the scenery emerging from the background reveals a sharedtendency, with individuals oriented towards self realization andautonomy, which are post­materialistic values according to RonaldInglehart’s definition (1977). The idea of value totally vanishing is notconvincing, however. We are well aware of the role that values still playwithin the contemporary world.
In the frame of international and national issues the attention to valueswas often shown in formal and substantial demanding solutions, as wellas with worldwide organizations such as ONU, UNESCO and FAO. Inethical codes written by professional corporations. there is a completevalue system to be considered in the first place. This value systemdecides what can be accepted and what cannot be accepted and itbecomes a means of control on norms obedience, especially if theprofessional relation directly implies other people. When certain valuesare so well interiorized as to be taken for granted and considered part ofcommon natural behaviour, the issue of the personal perspective forinterpersonal relations emerges. It is well known that values are continuously re­defined byindividuals during daily interactions. However, discontinuities are to betaken into account as well. Discontinuities, in fact, can be found withinthe same country, as well as in the same religion. All types ofgeneralizations risk confusing a sociological point of view so as toobscure any trends in empirical consistency. On another side, we shouldremember that every relation is a power relation, which is exerted inboth ways: those who hold the power may not use it directly; however,those who do not hold power have a basic disadvantage but they cannotalso recur to any coactive action, which is not a secondary issue. It isnot always easy to define which the desirable position in some givencondition is. We may have to give up some primary values because ofan impossibility of action in harmony with personal referee tendenciesor because in contrast with other individuals preferring less sharedopinions, which are based on values opposite to those of participation,
Conclusion
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respect of individuals, gradual intervention. Moreover, if we considerthe people to whom a certain intervention is addressed, the issue is evenmore complicated. If they do not share the same values as those offeringthe intervention and are moved by other base values than the foreignerswilling to help, every single step will be overcharged with difficulties.That is why also offering solutions that please only holders of economicpower are not a good strategy (such as those who finance an initiative).On the contrary, ways out have to be found for the receivers in order tosolve their dependence on economic powers. Even if values have a long life, they do not remain the same duringtime. They may show contradictions, inadequacy, andincomprehensibility. Not everybody has capacities, knowledge,experience and solutions enough to overcome the critical stage of adecision to take, choosing between local traditions and innovativeglobal values. We have to underline that economic and technologicalgrowth cannot be defined harmful per se. In a situation where humanvalues should be harmful, they would be able to stop any development,in order to prevent any negative consequences from occurring. Thesame change of values is, however, not completely extraneous tofinancial and technical transformations. An obvious objection that canbe made is actually a question: can the present system of values induceus to make previsions on the effects of future development? The answeris positive, because it is hard to believe that human beings would be soblind as not to realize the path undertaken and of its possible immediateor future destination. In fact, the rationality of an intervention is supported by a basis ofvalues, no matter ­ as Inglehart says (1977) ­ if it is a materialistic ornon materialistic one. This group of basic values does not prevent onefrom recurring to new solutions, to new systems, new energies and newresources. Pessimistic hypotheses, however, do not consider that in thefuture new discoveries, new treatments, new systems, new procedures,new findings and new applications can take place. Furthermore, they arenot able to define what the next generations may have towards arisingnovelties. Once more, it is quite likely that human beings will be able to facefuture problems with an adequate reserve of wisdom. This does not
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mean that chosen solutions will always be the right, rational or winningones. There will be drawbacks, defeats and second thoughts. But it ishard to believe that social actors will ever encourage the desire for self­destruction. Finally, the very value which is rather difficult to abandonis still the value of existence, even if there are always exceptions.
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